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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERDA LYNN dba LYNN REALTY 
and UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC., 
a Utah Corportion, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
K. C. RANCHES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10611 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs and Respondents as Real Estate Brok-
ers and agents have sued K. C. Ranches, Inc., for 
a real estate commission based upon a listing agree-
ment, and upon the signing of an Earnest Money 
Receipt and offer to purchase, and the said K. C. 
Ranches, Inc., contends there was no binding agree-
ment or meeting of the minds in regard to the mat-
ter and thus no commission is payable. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, sitting 
without a jury, rendered judgment in favor of Plain-
tiffs for a real estate commission in the sum of 
$15,950.000 together with interest in the sum of 
$797.50. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and Appellant seeks an order of 
the Court that no real estate commission was earned 
or payable and in no event was binding on K. C. 
Ranches, Inc., and consequently the judgment ren-
dered in the lower court should be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 23, 1965, Mary H. Bennett, 
Secretary of K. C. Ranches, Inc., a Corporation, en-
tered into a listing agreement with United Farm 
Agency (Exhibit P-1) for the sale of about 884 acres 
of ranch type property located near Roosevelt, Utah. 
The terms of the sale as listed include a sale price 
at $135,000.00 with 29 % to be paid as a down pay-
ment, being $39,150.00 cash. 
On or about May 17, 1965, Verda Lynn, dba 
as Lynn Realty, presented to Mary H. Bennett an 
Earnest Money Receipt and offer to purchase (Ex-
hibit P-2). At the time the offer was presented to 
Mary H. Bennett, it contained the signatures of the 
prospective purchasers, James L. and George G. 
Gamble in two places ( R. 40, 41) . The off er pro-
vided for no earnest money payment to go to sellers 
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as consideration, no cash down, but an interest in 
land, to be traded, which was located in Davis Coun-
ty, Utah, by June 1, 1965. The sale price for the 
Ranch property was thus shown to be $159,500.00 
and the interest in land being traded was shown at 
$25,000.00. 
Mary Bennett did not sign the offer or date the 
same in the spaces provided for the seller, or where 
the Gambles had signed. Instead Mrs. Verda Lynn 
wrote in ink at the bottom of the offer "Commission 
to be paid by 50% ownership in the 25 acres of land 
being traded". Then Mary Bennett insisted in writ-
ing on the offer further, in her handwriting, "must 
be accepted by United Farm Agency, K. C. Ranches, 
Inc., Mary H. Bennett, Sec." (R-39, 40) 
There was no written acceptance by United 
Farm Agency or Verda Lynn dba Lynn Realty, and 
whether there was any verbal acceptance is in serious 
dispute, nor were there any further signatures or 
initials made on the document by the prospective pur-
chasers or other acknowledgment of acceptance by 
them after the inked-in portion shown on the Earnest 
Money Receipt and offer to Purchase was placed 
there by the said Mary H. Bennett. 
Within a matter of two days or so from May 
17, 1965, Mary H. Bennett notified the prospective 
purchasers and the real estate people that the trans-
action was off ( R 42, 43 ; 92-5 ; 93-4) . Then on May 
29, 1965, a registered letter was received by United 
Farm Agency from K. C. Ranches, Inc. notifying 
them to withdraw the K. C. Ranches, Inc. properties 
from the market, (Exhibit D-5). Thereafter, the 
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prospective purchasers, Gambles, were sold another 
piece of real property by the United Farm Agency 
and Verda Lynn and they split the real estate com-
mission ( Rl 02-11). 
Also, K. C. Ranches, Inc. subsequently conveyed 
all the properties in the name of K. C. Ranches, 
Inc., including the property involved in this law 
suit, to Doxey-Layton Company (R 48-19). Subse-
quently, Doxey-Layton Company sold all the K. C. 
Ranches properties to a Mr. Mangum for approxi-
mately $137,000.00 on contract (R 47-19; 48-3). 
The facts further show that K. C. Ranches, 
Inc. was a Utah Corporation with 15,000 shares of 
stock issued, and that the main business of the Cor-
poration was ranching and farming (Exhibit P-3). 
Also, at the time Mary H. Bennett entered into the 
listing agreement with United Farm Agency as well 
as the time when the offer of May 17, 1965 was 
presented to her, no resolution or other Board or 
corporate act authorizing the sale of the corporate 




THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OF-
FER TO PURCHASE WAS AV ALID AND BONA 
FIDE CONTRACT. 
The question in this case does not involve the 
fact of whether Plaintiffs presented a Buyer ready, 
willing and able to purchase in accordance with the 
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listing agreement in order to entitle them to a com-
mission, but rather the question appears to be wheth-
er or not there was a bona fide contract actually 
entered into and a meeting of the minds, on the 
terms that were different from the listing agree-
ment, between the parties concerned. This included 
the Plaintiffs as well as the purchasers. 
It appears to counsel for Appellant that the 
purported Earnest Money Agreement fails in two 
areas of contract law, to wit: ( 1) acceptance of 
the offer and, ( 2) consideration. 
As to the acceptance of the off er by K. C. 
Ranches, Inc., as it was presented to Mary Bennett 
on or about May 17, 1965, it is clear from Exhibit 
P-2 and the evidence that the offer was unaccept-
able because of the problem of real estate commis-
sion and no cash down payment (R 55-10; 58-12; 
64; 90). Consequently the fact that K. C. Ranches 
did not sign where the off er called for the Seller 
to sign, but instead wrote on the bottom of the offer 
by hand "commission to be paid by 50% ownership 
in the 25 acres of land being traded. Must be accepted 
by United Farm Agency", constituted nothing more 
than a counter offer on the part of K. C. Ranches, 
which in turn required an additional acceptance 
on the part of the purchasers, who were the original 
offerors. 
This is fundamental law, as stated in Volume 
17, American Jurisprudence 2nd, Page 400-1, Sec-
tion 62: 
The rule is fundamental that an accept-
ance must comply with the terms of the offer 
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- that is, in order to form a conti·act, the 
offer and acceptance must express assent to 
one and the same thing ... an offer imposes 
no obligations until accepted according to its 
terms, without qualification or departure. 
---------------- A qualified acceptance is simply a 
counteroffer - it is also a general rule that 
where an offer is made to a particular person 
a reply which attempts to substitute or add 
another as a party to the proposed contract, 
for direct performance of or participation in 
the fulfillment of the obligation involved or a 
material part thereof, is tantamount to a coun-
teroffer and in effect a rejection of the offer. 
In our case, not only was there a clear cut quali-
fication imposed by K. C. Ranches, Inc., but another 
party, the real estate people, were brought into the 
offer, and thus a rejection of the original offer. 
The question then arises, whether or not there 
was an acceptance of the offeree's conditions, quali-
fications, and counteroffer in some way by the pur-
chasers before the withdrawal of said counteroffer 
by Mary H. Bennett. 
We submit to the court that there was no such 
acceptance by the Gambles, the off erors. 
The usual, customary and proper way to have 
shown the acceptance and consent by the Gambles 
wast o have them initial or sign below the counter-
offer or qualification, as they had previously done 
on the offer, below the portion referring to the dairy 
stock (Exhibit P-2), and especially in view of the 
fact that 25 acres of land was not shown in the 
original offer by the Gambles, but only a $25,000.00 
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interest in land. It had to be acknowledged that it 
was 25 acres and not 20 or 21 acres or some other 
figure. This was not done. Nor was any other form 
of acceptance shown by the off erors. In fact the only 
evidence appears to be that the question of commis-
sion and trade of some 25 acres of land was still 
up in the air ( R 70-21) at the time the first com-
munication was made between Mary H. Bennett 
and Jam es Gamble ( R 79-28) and this was about 
two days or so following the 17th day of May, 1965. 
Mr. Gamble testified as follows (R 80-22): "and I 
contacted her there and asked her if she still wanted 
us to come out and take over, and she said, 'NO', I 
have met some complications. I will contact you 
later." 
Then again, on cross examination, in response 
to the question about whether Mr. Gamble had any-
thing to say about the qualifications and conditions 
imposed by K. C. Ranches, Inc. on the off er as com-
municated to him, he answered, "I didn't say noth-
ing. It wasn't nothing to do with me. It didn't mat-
ter to me one way or the other." ( R 82-84). 
But it did matter. Some acknowledgment had to 
come from them, not only as to the 25 acres being 
the amount traded, but also their willingness to 
deed the ownership in others than the Seller. 
Thus, there was no attempt on the part of the 
purchasers, offerors, to accept the counteroffer and 
qualifications imposed by K. C. Ranches, Inc. 
Again to cite some fundamental law, Volume 17; 
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Page 405, Section 
66. 
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Where an off eree does not accept the of fer 
as made but makes a qualified or conditional 
acceptance, there is no contract unless the 
offeror consents to the qualification or condi-
tion tendered by the Off eree. U ndoubtedlv an 
offeree has the right to make his accept~nce 
depend upon any fact he might name, includ-
ing the approval of the offer by his attorney. 
See also annotation of cases cited in 135 
ALR 822-3. 
Therefore, inasmuch as Mary H. Bennett informed 
the parties and Plaintiffs within a rnatte1· of a 
couple of days of her withdrawal of the offe1· ::tlld 
not wishing to go ahead on any deal, ( R 59-29; 80-
22; 92-6; 93-8), there was no binding contract en-
tered into which would pennit a commission to be 
paid. 
As to the question of consideration in the off er 
to purchase, there was no consideration given that 
would make a binding contract between purchasers 
and sellers. The only consideration mentioned or 
involved was $1. 00 to Verda Lynn for presenting 
the offer, and that seems questionable, but not even 
that amount was to go to K. C. Ranches, Inc. to 
apply on, and as consideration in the transactio~1. 
as.noted from exhibit P-2. Furthermore, on a $159 1-
500.00 deal there appeared no way to charge the 
p-µrchaser with any damages if they had chosen to 
bi1,'ck out of the transaction, because there was abso-
lutely nothing paid dovm to bind the deal, to use 
as Jiquidated chu•·wges as the agreement called for, 
and there was no attached inventory of equipment 
or. livestock, making the off e1· completely uncertain 
9 
and again providing an escape for the purchasers if 
they so desired. 
There was not only an insufficiency of money 
or moneys worth with this size of a transaction, but 
there was no benefit to the promisor or detriment 
to the promisee involved, and certainly nothing mov-
ing, as consideration, to the Seller. Consequently 
there was no binding contract, and Plaintiffs earned 
no comm1ss10n. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THERE WAS AN ACCEPTANCE BY UNITED 
FARM AGENCY OF THE CONDITION AND 
Q U A L I F I C A T I 0 N IMPOSED BY K. C. 
RANCHES, INC. IN THE OFFER. 
The terms of the off er presented to Mary H. 
Bennett for K. C. Ranches, Inc. were considerably 
different than the terms on the listing agreement 
(Exhibit P-1), and the main difference, perhaps, 
was in the down payment. The listing agreement 
called for 29 % down payment in cash, or $39,150.00. 
The offer of May 17, 1965, called for no cash pay-
ment, but a trade of a $25,000.00 interest in land in 
Davis County, Utah. So the evidence is clear that 
Mary H. Bennett was seriously concerned about the 
payment of a $15,950.00 commission, and there could 
be no deal until this part of the transaction was com-
pletely cleared up ( R 57, 58, 64). Consequently, the 
qualification and condition was written in on the 
bottom of the off er involving the commission and 
the acceptance by United Farm Agency. 
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Now aside from the fact that the handwritten 
portion amounted to a counteroffer which required 
a further acceptance from the purchasers, Gambles, 
to be binding, it also involved the attempted creation 
of a new commission agreement, between K. C. 
Ranches, Inc. and United Farm Agency which was 
different from the listing agreement previously bind-
ing them. This new writing then, obviously required 
an acceptance on the part of United Farm Agency 
for the same legal reasons as set out in the argument 
for Point I, herein in order to be binding and so that 
the parties would not be bound or relying on the 
listing agreement for the commission (Exhibit P-1). 
Now the very fact that Plaintiffs have relied all 
along in this lawsuit and sued upon the listing agree-
ment (Exhibit P-1) for their commission, they con-
versely have not relied upon, intended to be bound 
by, or accepted the new agreement purportedly made 
and thus should be estopped from attempting to 
collect a commission. Furthermore Plaintiff, Verda 
Lynn, was never a party or involved with the listing 
agreement and cannot sue thereunder. Plaintiffs did 
not present a Buyer ready, willing and able to per-
form in accordance with the terms of the listing 
agreement and cannot obtain a commission based 
upon that agreement. Had Plaintiffs intended to 
accept the commission agreement as purportedly 
offered by K. C. Ranches, Inc. on May 17, 1965, 
they would have based their lawsuit on that agree-
ment and sued for the value of what 50% of the said 
25 acres of land was reasonably worth. We believe 
this is additional evidence, in addition to that which 
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is set out in the record, of the non acceptance by 
United Farm Agency. 
Now when Mary H. Bennett insisted on writing 
in the offer (R-39) "must be accepted by United 
Farm Agency," this is exactly what she meant, and 
this was not done, either written or any clear cut 
verbal expression. 
Mrs. Verda Lynn, one of the Plaintiffs, testi-
fied on direct examination in regard to the qualifica-
tion on the commission, that she handed the off er 
to Mary H. Bennett to sign and Mrs. Bennett said: 
"This will have to be accepted by Mr. Massey" ( R 
90-27). Mrs. Lynn then argued with her that she 
was accepting for Mr. Massey and United Farm 
Agency, but Mary H. Bennett still insisted on having 
an acceptance from him (R 91-3). Then Verda Lynn 
testified that she got in touch with Mr. Massey and 
he was told "Will you please get in touch with her 
too and tell her you have accepted it?" (R 91-20). 
This was never done by Mr. Massey. Then again on 
cross examination Mrs. Lynn stated in response to 
the question "Why was it so strong about United 
Farm Agency accepting it?" as follows: "She wasn't 
that strong on the thing. We wrote it in because she 
said, "I want to be sure on this!" Therefore, this 
was not a matter of an agent accepting for his prin-
cipal, but a clear cut intent to have an acceptance 
from United Farm Agency, and that was part of 
the condition and qualification. The Lower Court 
found that Verda Lynn accepted for United Farm 
Agency, but we submit that this was not sufficient. 
There should have been a finding of whether United 
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Farm Agency actually accepted. Furthermore, Marv 
H. Bennett's testimony was emphatic about the fa~t 
that United Farm Agency, not only finally turned 
down the qualification about the new commission 
arrangement ( R 43-16), but also was emphatic and 
positive about their not wishing to go on the deal 
unless the land was worth it and could be sold quick-
ly, which was another condition attached to any 
acceptance. (R 43-18; 56-11; 58-12; 61-4; 104-20) 
Also, Mr. Massey did not fully dispute this part 
of the evidence ( R 99-9; 101-26). We submit, there-
fore, that the matter was still left in doubt and up in 
the air, and not an unqualified acceptance on the 
part of United Farm Agency. 
Another matter which should be mentioned 
here, is as to the credibility of the testimony of Mary 
H. Bennett. It should be kept in mind that counsel 
for Defendant and Appellant was substituted in 
the case because of the interest in the outcon1e of 
the matter of Doxey-Layton Company. Mary Ben-
nett had her own separate legal counsel. Thus, if she 
was an adverse witness, she was adverse to both 
sides. In order words, Mary Bennett had nothing to 
gain or to lose as to that part of the evidence she 
actually testified to. On the other hand, Mrs. Verda 
Lynn and Mr. Jarrell Massey were directly inter-
ested and prejudiced from a monetary standpoint 
about the outcome of the case. In this respect, we 
submit to the Court that even greater weight and 
credibility should be given the testimony of Mary H. 
Bennett than the other interested parties. 
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As to the nece8sity of a written acceptance by 
United Farm Agency on the new commission agree-
ment, we believe that the whole import and intent 
imbodied in the condition "must be accepted", re-
quired additional signatures or written acceptance, 
and especially where Mary H. Bennett was not satis-
fied with Verda L:)rnn's oral acceptance ( R 90-27). 
This was also Mary Bennett's testimony ( R 64-30; 
65-2; 105-4). 
In Volume 17, American Jurisprudence 2nd, 
Page 410, Section 71, it states: 
A contract may be signed on condition that 
it shall not take effect until others have signed 
it or it may be the manifest intent of the 
parties that the contract is not to be effective 
until signed by all intended parties; in such 
case, in the absence of any of the signatures 
so required, the contract being joint, cannot 
be enforced against those who did sign it. 
See also Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 25-5-4 (5) 
and combined 111 eta ls, Inc. vs. Bastian, 71 U.535; 
267 P 1020, for necessity of a writing in such cases. 
-_POINT III 
THE ACTION OF MARY H. BENNETT IN 
THE TRANSACTION \VAS NOT BINDING ON 
THE K. C. RANCHES, INC., CORPORATION. 
In response to counsel for Plaintiffs' question, 
"\Vere you authorized by the Corporation to sign 
this document?", Mary H. Bennett answered, "No 
one had given me any authority. I took it upon my-
self." ( R 44-22). 
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Counsel also made a point of the fact that 15,000 
shares of stock had been issued, (Exhibit P-3), al-
though Mary Bennett appeared to be the principle 
stockholder. 
In view of these facts and further that the real 
estate transaction contemplated here involved all, 
or essentially all, of the property and assets of K. C. 
Ranches, Inc., Corporation, it required notice, a 
proper meeting, consent and resolution of the stock-
holders and board of directors in order to bind the 
Corporation. 
Under the Utah Business Corporation Act, 16-
10-74 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, it sets out 
in detail the requirements which must be followed 
by a corporation to authorize the sale of all, or sub-
stantially all, the property and assets of the Corpo-
ration, if not made in the usual and regular course 
of its business. None of these steps was taken or 
complied with by the officers or directors of K. C. 
Ranches, Inc., Corporation in this case. Furthermore, 
there should be no question here that the sale of 
all the ranch and farm properties, equipment and 
stock was not "in the usual and regular course of its 
business." The purpose of the Corporation as set 
out in its Articles of Incorporation on file (Article 
VII ( 1) ) and as shown by (Exhibit P-3), was "to 
engage in the business of farming and ranching." To 
sell all of the ranch and farm properties on contract 
would then actually put the corporation out of busi-
ness. 
Furthermore, the Articles of Incorporation on 
file in the Secretary of State's Office, of the K. C. 
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Ranches, Inc., show in Article X that "The Board 
may not sell or exchange all of the property of the 
corporation in bulk unless there shall have been prior 
ratification of such action, said ratification shall 
be in the form of an affirmative vote of not less 
than 50 % of the outstanding capital stock of the 
corporation." 
Here, no Board meeting was held, no vote taken, 
no ratification of the action, and thus no authoriza-
tion binding the corporation in the sale. 
Consequently, counsel for Appellant contends 
that the action of Mary H. Bennett in the transac-
tions could not and did not bind the Corporation, 
K. C. Ranches, Inc., and Plaintiffs' judgment against 
said Corpora ti on should be reversed. 
See also Volume 19, American Jurisprudence 
2nd, Page 911, Section 1533. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT CLAIM A REAL ES-
TATE COMMISSION BASED UPON THE LIST-
ING AGREEMENT, AND THEY SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING THIS COM-
MISSION. 
The listing agreement, Exhibit P-1 Paragraph 
( c) provides: "I agree to pay you forthwith as com-
mission 1 O % of the selling price, when a purchaser 
is procured through you, or your representative at 
the stated price and terms, or at any other price and 
terms acceptable to me." Then in Paragraph ( d) 
of the same agreement it provides: "If the property 
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described herein is sold, during the term of this 
agreement, to a purchaser procured through my own 
efforts, or through any broker, agent, person or 
organization other than you, I will immediately 
pay you one-half the amount of commission provided 
in clause (c) above." (Thus, any new commission 
arrangement had to be accepted not only by Verda 
Lynn, but also specifically by United Farm Agency.) 
Now Verda Lynn was not a party to the listing 
agreement, so any commission she might earn had 
to come through United Farm Agency, or a new 
agreement. 
On the Earnest Money Receipt and offer to pur-
chase, (Exhibit P-2, at line 41), it provided for an 
amount to be inserted as to a commission to be paid 
the selling agent. This was left blank and when the 
offer was presented to Mary Bennett, the terms 
were not acceptable to her and were not in accord-
ance with the terms of the listing agreement, espe-
cially as to cash down payment. So when Mary Ben-
nett wrote in the offer the conditions about payment 
of a commission, what effect did this have on the 
listing agreement, even if we assume for this argu-
ment that all parties involved had accepted the condi-
tions on the offer? We submit that the effect would 
be a new commission agreement, and would do away 
with and make null and void the listing agreement 
(Exhibit P-1) as it pertained to the amount of com-
mission payable. Mary H. Bennett had refused to 
pay a 10 % commission of the selling price, by this 
new agreement, and so if we again assume there 
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was a breach by K. C. Ranches, Inc. of the new agree-
ment, does this mean that Plaintiffs may then re-
vert back to the former listing agreement and sue 
thereon? We think not. Plaintiffs remedy would 
be to sue on the agreement and contract breached, 
if any, and by not doing so we contend that Plain-
tiffs have waived their remedy. It is obvious, there-
fore, that Plaintiffs may not recover a 10% com-
mission based upon the listing agreement, for it is 
clear that this was never agreed to by the parties. 
(See Miller vs. Cortese, 271 P 2nd 87 and also Cooley 
vs. Frank, 235 P 2nd 446.) 
As to a further argument that Plaintiffs should 
be estopped from collecting this commission, we 
refer the court to the evidence given by United Farm 
Agency through Mr. Jarrell Massey in response to 
a question put to him as to why he had not signed 
his name after Mary Bennett's on the offer, wherein 
he stated (R 102-7) : 
It was never brought out there and never 
was really considered necessary. In fact, we 
went ahead and through Lynn Realty sold 
these same buyers some property later, and 
she went ahead and handled the arrangements 
and took care of the commission split. We 
didn't sign any agreement on it either. 
Therefore, since these buyers pursued the mat-
ter no further, and went ahead with the purchase 
of another property, and since these same Plaintiffs, 
as real estate agents, each received their full com-
mission from the sale, they have acquiesced in and 
consented to the withdrawal of the K. C. Ranches, 
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Inc. transaction and should be estopped from collect-
ing another commission herein. 
Furthermore, Mary H. Bennett's testimony in 
her conversation with Mr. Massey of United Farm 
Agency involving a possible lawsuit over commis-
sions was as follows: (R 104-27): 
. . . and he also told me whether the deal 
went through or not, and he would just as 
soon it didn't, because Mrs. Lynn could not 
sue without his help and he says, "United 
Farm Agency does not make sales, when it 
isn't to the benefit of all parties concerned." 
This evidence is corroborated by Mr. Massey 
as shown in the Record ( R 102-22), and again at 
(R 103-3) wherein Mr. Massey said "Well, let's get 
one thing straight. I am not suing for a commissionn 
- "as far as my bringing a suit, well, I didn't do 
that. Let's put it that way." 
It is therefore obvious that such a conversation 
took place between Mr. Massey and Mrs. Bennett 
as she testified to, and consequently Mary Bennett 
was led to believe, even if there had been a valid 
deal between them, that she had no concern about 
a lawsuit with respect to a commission. 
It would be most inequitable and unjust in view 
of Plaintiffs conduct of selling and receiving a com-
mission from Buyers on another property and their 
apparent acquiescence and consent in the action and 
decision of Mary Bennett to allow Plaintiffs a com-
mission on this transaction and they should be 
estopped from collecting the same. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law is clear that the condition and qualifi-
cation set out by Mary H. Bennett on the offer of 
May 17, 1965 amounted to a mere counter offer, at 
most, which required an acceptance on the part of 
both buyers and United Farm Agency before a bind-
ing contract could be created. 
It is also clear, from the evidence, that no writ-
ten acceptance of said counter proposal existedi 
which we believe was required and the actual inh:nt 
of the parties, nor was there any meeting of the 
minds from a verbal or oral standpoint on the ac-
ceptance of the counter offer by either buyers or 
Plain tiffs. 
Furthermore, were we to assume a valid accept-
ance on the part of United Farm Agency in regard 
to the commission, a new commission agreement 
would have existed and Plaintiffs could not recover 
any 10% commission as based upon the original 
listing agreement, and in effect Plaintiffs have sued 
upon the wrong contract. 
It is apparent, also, from an examination of 
the evidence and the Utah Business Corporation 
Law, that Mary H. Bennett had no authorization of 
K. C. Ranches, Inc., corporation to sell substantially 
all of the corporate assets, and any agreement that 
may have been attempted by the said Mary H. Ben-
nett could have no binding affect upon the Corpora-
tion. 
Finally, the fact that United Farm Agency 
never did intend to sue for themselves for a commis-
sion and the fact that each of the Plaintiffs received 
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a commission on the sale of other properties to these 
same buyers, negates any damages to them in regard 
to this transaction and it would be inequitable and 
unjust for them to collect another commission here. 
Clearly, therefore, the judgment of the Lower 
Court should be reversed. 
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